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Like all African countries, Sudan as a nation state, is an imposition of the 
colonial imagination; a process that gathered diverse ethnic groups, often with 
little in common among themselves, under the banner of one unity. The 
diversity of Sudan’s population is highlighted by the sheer number of 
languages, 160 or so, spoken within its national boundaries.  
Diversity within a nation need not be a death sentence for its unity. After 
all, history is replete with countries whose very homogeneity failed to 
guarantee the unity of their people. Somalia and Rwanda are perfect 
examples of the illusion of the promise of homogeneity. Having said that, 
Sudanese people, or rather their leaders, must stop blaming the country’s 
colonial history for its misfortunes. Since becoming independent in 1956, 
Sudanese leaders have had ample time to harness that diversity and turn it 
into a catalyst for enrichment and cultural harmony. Instead, successive 
governments - democratic, dictatorial, socialist and theocratic alike - did 
exactly the opposite, and in fact, competed to do so. In the process, they 
almost destroyed that diversity and entrenched the hegemony of a minority 
culture of the northern region over the rest of the country.  
In as much as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 
January, 2005 has put an end to civil war in the south of Sudan, it has also 
posed an imminent threat to the unity of the country. The CPA gave the south 
of Sudan the right of self determination, a gain which southerners will surely 
use for secession. As recently as December 2008, Vuni wrote: 
“The Speaker of Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) James Wani 
Igga told a religious celebration in Juba that the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement is committed to achieve an independent state in southern Sudan” 
Vuni 2008). 
There is nothing wrong with the right of self determination as such. It is a 
legitimate right for ill treated minorities. Nonetheless, self determination can 
be problematic in the sense that it often stifles the search for commonalities 
and the effort to end discrimination, thus leading people to contemplate 
secession. This is the trap in which Sudan finds itself. 
Sudan had a brief moment of hope with the accession to power of the late 
John Garang as part of the CPA. His reception at Khartoum, which attracted 
no less than four million attendees, bolstered hope that his dream of New 
Sudan, a Sudan that can accommodate all its diverse groups, was soon to be 
realised and under the leadership of none other than Garang himself. Some 
Sudanese who are steeped in traditional lore think that Sudan is a bewitched 
country and that nothing good will come its way. Well, Garang who was the 
only hope and author of New Sudan died in a tragic air crash soon after his 
inauguration. He left an agreement (the CPA) which only he could have kept 
afloat. Richard Williamson, George W. Bush’s Special Envoy to Sudan 
described the CPA, to which his government acts as a major guarantor, as “a 
leaky boat” (Van Oudenaren 2008). 
The CPA gave what I dare to describe as an illusory hope that it would put an 
end to the nation’s endemic disease of marginalisation that underpins the 
hegemony of three tiny ethnic groups over the rest of the country. This is what 
I outline as the domination of a tripartite coalition of the Shaigyia, the Jaalyeen 
and the Danagla over the nation. In the language of the widely read Black 
Book of Sudan, this underscores the “five-ninety five” thesis; a situation 
whereby five per cent of Sudan’s population are in control of the remaining 
ninety five percent at all levels: cultural, economic, political and military (see 
El-Tom 2003, 2006 and 2008).  
The Sudanese people were justified in their overall celebration of the signing 
of the CPA (January 2005). The agreement promised an end to 
marginalisation and a New Sudan that would accord equal opportunity to all, 
irrespective of ethnic, religious, regional or cultural origin; a dream that is 
cherished in every African country and beyond. Little did the Sudanese people 
know that the CPA is ill suited to deliver its promised New Sudan. Far from it, 
the CPA curbs excesses of the northern elite in the south but at the same time 
enables a life line for the continuing domination of the tri-partite coalition over 
the rest of the population. The tri-partite coalition operates under the Jallaba 
institution that enacts control over the whole of Sudan. The term Jallaba 
means procurers of slaves in Sudan’s history, and later, legitimate traders 
after abolition of slavery. It is used across Sudan to describe traders from the 
northern region of Sudan who come to dominate the economy of the country, 
but equally, who orchestrate national government politics. The Jallaba 
metamorphosed into a system that defines everything in the country from 
style of dress to culture and political ideology (see El-Tom 2006). Hence, it is 
legitimate to talk about the Jallaba as an institution rather than a simple 
network of traders. 
Despite their undoubted goodwill, engineers of the CPA committed a grave 
error that later came to pose a continuous threat to the agreement. 
Throughout negotiation of the agreement, two major assumptions were taken 
for granted, bolstered by military prowess on either side of the divide as well. 
The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM) were dominant in 
the Christian south of the Sudan while the National Congress Party, the ruling 
power of Khartoum took full charge of the other side. The corollary was simple, 
at least for those who did not bother to tax their minds. Sudan was taken to 
divide neatly into a predominantly Christian south represented by the SPLM, 
while the greater, northern part of the country was to be represented by the 
NCP of Al-Bashir. Ironically, Al-Bashir’s delegation to the negotiation became 
the guardians of the interests of all non-south Sudan, including Darfur.  
As far as the Darfuris are concerned, their vindication took some time to 
materialise. The premature loss of Dr Garang pushed the CPA off course for a 
while, thus dampening but still allowing the CPA euphoria to continue until 
September 2005 when the so-called government of national unity (GNU) was 
formed. The composition of the GNU proved beyond doubt that the tripartite 
coalition is agreement proof (see Table 1).  
Table 1. 
Old habits die hard: Formation of the GNU- Sept 05 
Region  No. of Positions  % population  
Southern  16  16  
Northern  20*  5.4  
Kordofan  6  12  
Darfur  6  20  
Eastern  0  11 
Central  0  26.5 
*Shaigiya 3, Jaalyeen 12 and Danagla 5. 
The formation of the GNU has certainly proven that south Sudan has come of 
age. However, in so far as the hegemony of the northern region over other 
marginalised parts of the Sudan is concerned, the CPA is no more than a 
benign pussy cat that can easily be pushed aside when necessary.  
Like religion, nationalism is an ideology that underpins important values but 
often stifles debate and suffocates thinking. Thus the composition of the GNU 
did not alert many of our fellow marginalised people about the power naively 
accorded to the CPA. Those who failed to board the CPA were simply 
discredited as separatist, tribalist, racist or simply agents for malicious foreign 
circles. But the addiction of the Jallaba institution to power and their 
unflinching belief in the divine right of the northern elite to rule Sudan exposed 
further cracks in the national CPA promise. While the CPA continues to 
deliver, though unsatisfactorily for the south, its national dimensions received 
another blow later on. CPA allies in non-southern regions were stunned by the 
constitution of the re-election of the political bureau of the National Congress 
Party (NCP). As its name suggests, the NCP conjures an image of a modern 
party that draws its support, membership and leadership from all over the 
Sudan. In accordance with that profile, the NCP acted as a guardian of all 
non-southerners in the negotiations that produced the CPA. In January 2006, 
while the Darfur peace talks were going on, the NCP announced its new 
political bureau members, computed by the author as below.  
Table 2. 
How National is the National Congress Party? Political Bureau of the 
NCP, January 2006. 
Region  No of members  % Population of region 
Northern  14  5.4 
Kordofan  4  12 
Darfur  1  20 
Central + Khartoum  6  26.5 
Southern  2  16 
Unknown  3  NA 
Total  30  NA 
As Table 2 shows, the composition is simply farcical when read in light of the 
NCP’s claim to be a national party. Membership affirms that the NCP is no 
more than a Trojan horse for the northern region and its three elite ethnic 
groups. With membership of eight for the Jalyeen, seven for the Shaigya and 
two for the Danagla, the northern region, homeland of these ethnic groups is 
assured a blatant majority in Sudan’s ruling party.  
Throughout the recent history of the Sudan, wealth has been deliberately 
diverted to the otherwise economically impoverished northern region. As a 
result, the northern region is by far more developed than other parts of the 
Sudan. This is the marginalisation thesis well articulated in the Black Book 
(see the Black Book). But the diversion of Sudan’s wealth to the northern 
region is not accidental. Rather it is a result of well planned and orchestrated 
actions of the NCP. In its party convention, September 2005, Hamdi, 
economic guru and Al-Bashir’s ex-Minister for Economy and Finance, advised 
that future investment and development in the Sudan should by-pass Darfur 
and focus on the northern Dongola-Sennar-Kordofan axis. Hamdi concluded 
that this triangle represents the hard-core of historic and future Arab-Islamic 
Sudan. Following segregation of the south, taken as given by Hamdi, this 
triangle guarantees power for the National congress party of Al-Bashir in 
future democratic Sudan. Darfur Arabs who took sides with Khartoum in the 
Darfur conflict have a lot to contemplate about their fateful alliance with the 
riverine people of Sudan. Hamdi conceded that the south will depart and form 
its own separate country and deprive the nation of 65% of public revenue and 
25% of Gross National Product. To add insult to injury, new western 
investment accruing from the CPA is well guarded and cannot be transferred 
to the northern region: 
“.. these investment funds will be supervised by commissions which ensure 
that they go to the specified zone only [south and Nuba Mountains]. Due to 
these facts, foreign  
investment will remain out of our hands and will not benefit the north much” 
(Hamdi 2005:12). 
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If Hamdi’s revelation proves anything, it is the very fact that the CPA has 
failed to dismantle the Jallaba hegemony. Hamdi is right in concluding that the 
south will secede. It will take SPLM leaders a miracle to reverse that trend. 
Far from it, the statement of Mr Igga, the Speaker of Southern Sudan 
Legislative Assembly stands as testimony to that (Quoted earlier in the text). 
Similar statements have been uttered before by many SPLM top leaders. 
Surprisingly, the majority of the SPLM leaders including Chairman Kiir claim to 
campaign for united Sudan. It is difficult not to conclude that these leaders are 
either out of touch with their grassroots’ opinion or are simply being deceptive 
to their government coalition partners in their insistence of the unity of Sudan.  
Hamdi’s proposition that Darfur may also go for separation is simply not 
correct. Compared to the south of Sudan, Darfur is more integrated by far into 
the country. Huge pockets of Darfurians are living in Khartoum, the Gezira 
area, Gadarif and Port Sudan in Eastern Sudan and many other parts far 
away from Darfur. These populations make separation too painful to even 
contemplate. 
While the south has given up the capital Khartoum mentally, the situation is 
different when it comes to Darfur. Frankly speaking, Darfur people will not 
leave the capital to the Riverine Sudanese and many of them believe that 
their stake in Khartoum is at least as strong as that of the Sudanese from the 
northern region who dominate the capital. 
The Abuja talks that ended with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) fiasco is 
also telling in this regard. During the talks, separation never entered upon the 
agenda of Darfur Movements. The Sudan Liberation of Darfur (SLM) 
unsuccessfully demanded the right to self determination for Darfur, but for 
tactical reasons. Self determination can also be used as a red card to 
precipitate a guarantee that full implementation of the agreement is reached. 
From its very name, the SLM is a national Movement and can never be 
reduced to a regional organisation. 
As far as JEM is concerned with respect to representation, JEM is a national 
institution by any measure. That is clear from its well articulated philosophy in 
general and throughout its deliberations at the Abuja talks. Many senior JEM 
leaders are not from Darfur. At the moment, both the Legislative Assembly 
and General Congress of JEM are headed by personnel from outside Darfur.  
Having said that, we must concede that Azrag, the head of a small JEM 
splinter group calls for self determination and the possible future separation of 
Darfur. But Azrag’s proposition is hollow, lacking credibility and support in 
Darfur. Surprisingly, Azrag’s separation idea came from me, the author of this 
article. In a general discussion between Ibrahim, the President of JEM, and 
myself, we wondered whether the brutal way the Darfur war was conducted 
by Khartoum government had diminished the faith of the Darfur people for a 
united Sudan. Due to our position, it was not possible for us to conduct a 
serious research investigation into this issue. Instead, I implemented a short 
questionnaire on the internet through a third party. The result was startling: 
62% of those who responded favoured self-determination for Darfur. But don’t 
hold your breath. Our investigation does not stand as a serious research 
project capable of ascertaining Darfur public opinion. The sample is very small, 
self selected, confined to internet users and with no guarantee that 
respondents are Darfurians. As such, we opted to discard the result but 
equally take note of it for future investigations.  
At the time of the questionnaire, Azrag had just left JEM and was desperate 
for a separate agenda that distinguished him from the organisation he left 
behind. Our work provided him with one, and self determination became a 
catch phrase in the literature of his organisation. Despite this, we have to 
acknowledge that supporters of a united Sudan are now besieged, both in the 
south and to lesser extent in Darfur.  
SPML and Darfur: 
Despite similarities between the problems of the south and those of Darfur, 
the latter has remained low in SPLM priorities. To date, Mr Kiir has not been 
able to visit Darfur. This embarrassing flaw has been exposed elsewhere in 
an article aptly entitled “Alfashir is nearer than Kampala” (El-Tom 2007). 
Rather than seeing his seat as that of the First Vice President for the whole of 
Sudan, Kiir has remained firmly focussed only on the south. His peace 
mediation efforts have been squarely lodged in reconciling the Ugandan 
government with the notorious rebels, the Lord’s Resistance Army. While 
Kiir’s peace work in Uganda should be commended, his failure to pay similar 
attention to Darfur is deplorable. 
Kiir’s contribution to Darfur, or rather its lack of it, is further complicated by his 
botched effort to unify Darfur Movements. Instead of unifying Darfur 
Movements under one to two units, the attempt led to the initiation of many 
Movements, some of which are hatched by the Khartoum government at the 
expense of the SPLM. At the moment, the SPLM is facing another problem 
with the Darfur people. Siddiq Abdel Kareem/ Masaleet, a Chief Commander 
of SLM unity was assassinated while attending Kiir’s unification mediation. 
Some members of the SLM are now implicating the SPLM in Commander 
Abdel Kareem’s death. Both the SPLM and the SLM are conducting their 
investigation in the case which is a clear embarrassment for the government 
of southern Sudan. 
Given the nature of the Darfur rebellion and the history of the SPLM, it is 
bewildering that the two organisations have not been able to enter into a 
strategic alliance against the Khartoum government. Indeed, such an alliance 
has always been a dream for JEM long before the tragic loss of Dr Garang. 
However, Kiir has consistently distanced himself from JEM while continuing to 
woo its rival Movement, the SLM. While this is difficult to explain, given the 
profile of JEM, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Kiir has fallen into the 
trap of Khartoum propaganda. In its effort to undermine JEM’s international 
profile, Khartoum’s media has laboured hard to stamp JEM as an Islamist 
Movement and a military wing of the (Islamist) Popular Congress Party of 
Turabi. Thus, in his visit to Cairo, February 2008, Kiir declared that JEM have 
an agenda “similar to those who want to implement Sharia Islamic law in 
Sudan” and that “other Darfur rebel Movements have different views from 
JEM and that they are (SPLM) trying to unify them”. Kiir’s unfortunate 
conclusion about JEM is perplexing to say the least and displays a flawed 
understanding of JEM. There can be no doubt that Dr Ibrahim, the president 
of JEM and many other JEM leaders were part of Turabi’s party. It is also true 
that JEM enjoins within its ranks, many leaders who were active members of 
other Sudanese parties, including the Communist party. By the same token, 
many SPLM’s peace and government coalition partners were also part of 
Turabi’s party. Both Al-Bashir and Taha, the darling of the west, were close 
confidants of Turabi. Kiir’s take on this issue is indeed difficult to justify. The 
political scene in Sudan and across the world is replete with politicians who 
have changed and switched political parties and JEM is no exception in this 
regard.  
JEM has declared many times that it is committed to a united Sudan. Much 
more than that, JEM is ready to work to remove all reasons that tempt the 
south to secede; for these are the same causes that made JEM raise arms 
against the government of Khartoum. But JEM also has to be realistic in its 
dreams. JEM, as well as all other stake holders, must realise that the 
departure of the south is only a matter of time and there is nothing much that 
can reverse that course of events. However, there is one thing that JEM and 
others can do. They can work to make that separation amicable and peaceful. 
The international community must move fast from now on and work to realise 
that objective. Unfortunately, indications are not encouraging. The 
government of both Khartoum and southern Sudan are preparing for war. In 
September 2008, we learnt that a ship pirated off the coast of Somalia which 
was loaded with army tanks, was destined for the government of south Sudan 
(GSS). Needless to say, that was against the CPA. A month later, Khartoum 
complained that an Ethiopian Antanov plane loaded with arms landed at Juba 
airport as part of that military build up. 
Khartoum government has also been preparing for the imminent violent 
separation. In December, 2008, Khartoum deployed six army battalions in 
south Kordofan. The deployment came afoot of thousands of other members 
of a force stationed in and around the disputed oil rich zone of Abeyei. GOSS, 
which hailed this military build up as incompatible with the CPA, is not 
convinced that the deployment is undertaken to protect the oil installations 
against JEM. Either way, these signs are clear reminders that all partners 
have to start as early as today, working for the peaceful but regretfully 
unavoidable departure of the south.  
Back to Darfur: 
That the Darfur problem is political and so is its solution, is a dictum that JEM 
has repeated and pursued for many years. Barring political suicide, JEM can 
only sign into a peace deal that is fair and dignified. For years Khartoum has 
been able to out- manoeuvre the international community with its incessant 
addiction to what the eminent Darfur expert Eric Reeves described as 
“pusillanimous” Darfur initiatives that are hardly worth the ink in which they are 
written. In the same week (October 2008) in which Khartoum received with 
praise and boosted the Qatari mediation, Al-Bashir launched his own so-
called Sudan People Initiative (SPI) presumably to work either in tandem or 
parallel to the Qatari initiative. The SPI was to be headed by a committee of 
five prominent figures of Al-Bashir, Nafie, Almahdi, Swar Eldahab and Kiir. 
Leaving Kiir aside - who had to be there in lieu of the CPA - the rest of the 
committee are carefully drawn from the northern region. The very composition 
of the chairing board of the SPI indicates that the interests of the northern 
region weigh more than the entire population of Darfur. Surprisingly, neither 
Mini Minnawi, the sole signatory to the DPA, nor representatives of Non-DPA 
signatories were included in the headship of SPI. As usual, the SPI turned out 
to be worth nothing at all. It came out with a unilateral cease fire which Al-
Bashir destroyed within 72 hours by attacking SLM in Muhagaria, JEM in 
Kulbus and a main IDP camp at Nertete in South Darfur. 
  
The discovery of oil in Sudan was widely celebrated by the Sudanese people 
as ushering their way into development. Little did many of them know that 
under callous governments, such a discovery would be anything but a 
blessing to the nation. Ex-Darfur governor Sese has computed that in at least 
one year, Sudan spent 60% of its oil revenue on defence. Thus, oil has 
become a tool for further destruction and not as hoped, a catalyst for 
development. It took JEM a few years to learn the simple lesson that with the 
steady increase in the flow of oil, Al-Bashir can sustain a low intensity war for 
good. Darfur will soon end up with second generation IDPs and refugees just 
as is the case in the south of the country. The international community, 
particularly with US attention focussed on its legitimate war against terror, can 
only do so much. At least they have kept Darfur IDPs and refugees alive since 
the onset of the Darfur war. For those very reasons, JEM has decided that 
there is neither a point in fighting in the desert of Darfur, nor in expecting the 
international community to do any more in Darfur. There is a consensus in 
JEM leadership, that for better or for worse, the battle has to be moved to 
where the decision is made - and that is the capital, Khartoum.  
  
In May 2008, JEM boldly invaded Khartoum under what was code-named 
Operation Long Arm (OLA). The aims of OLA were centred around four 
objectives: to forcibly depose Al-Bashir, reduce his hostile military capabilities, 
prove that he is incapable of defending Khartoum, let alone Darfur, and to 
engender life and momentum into the Darfur peace talks. It is obvious that 
JEM has failed to realise its first and prime objective and that is to dislodge 
the government of Khartoum. In so far as other objectives are concerned, 
JEM has been successful and has achieved further unintended gains. To 
begin with, Al-Bashir was forced to sideline the Sudan National Defence 
Forces (SNDF) and was reduced to reliance on an ethnic based militia to 
defend the capital. The daring operation catapulted JEM into a regional force 
and a mover and shaker within Sudan’s political arena. Growth of 




Let me borrow a phrase from the Cramer and state that civil war is not 
necessarily “a stupid thing” particularly when it comes to securing seminal and 
fundamental rights such as those the Darfuris are fighting for (Cramer 2006). 
While we affirm that Sudan’s problem is political and that recourse to violence 
is an inferior way of tackling such an impasse, we also have to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of that road. History abounds with the likes of Mugabe, Idi Amin, 
Hitler and Al-Bashir, with whom political reasoning is simply futile. JEM is still 
hopeful that Al-Bashir, particularly in light of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) threat, may come to his senses and heed the international appeal for a 
negotiated settlement of the Darfur problem. But JEM’s patience is not infinite. 
  
As I argued earlier, the departure of the south is a forgone conclusion. The 
rest of the Sudan will however hold. Looking at the political map of the Sudan, 
all major parties are pro-unity. One may even optimistically add almost all of 
the top leaders of the SPLM to that. Leaving south Sudan aside, the threat to 
the unity does not come from Darfur. Rather, it dwells in the very fact that all 
marginalised parts of Sudan have genuine grievances which have to have to 
be tackled to deliver unity of the country.  
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